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Abstract
Psychological and sociological factors constrain economic decision-making in
many contexts including the online world. Behavioural economics and economic
psychology emphasise that people will make mistakes in processing information
and in planning for the future; these mistakes will also distort learning processes.
Emotions and visceral factors will play a key role - not only affecting people’s
actions but also distorting the interactions between information, learning and
choices. This will have wide-ranging implications for online behavior and infor-
mation security management, making people more vulnerable to security/privacy
abuses including hacking, spam attacks, phishing, identity theft and online finan-
cial exploitation. These vulnerabilities raise crucial policy questions - recently
made more pressing in the light of recent phone-hacking scandals in the UK.
This paper outlines some of the behavioural factors affecting people’s online be-
haviour and analyses real-world reactions to online fraud using evidence from the
British Crime Survey 2009-10.
Keywords: behavioural economics, information security, online fraud, cognitive bias
JEL codes: D03,D18,D83,K42
1 Introduction
As more and more human activity is concentrated in the internet, pressure grows on
financial information systems to adapt to the increased volume of online activity, in-
cluding banking / shopping and social networking. Electronic monetary instruments
including electronic cash and mobile payments are proving to be potentially supe-
rior substitutes for conventional monetary instruments but significant problems have
emerged. Alongside the positive innovations, technological innovations have facilitated
significant abuses such as anti-social behavior; security/privacy abuses including hack-
ing, spam attacks, phishing, identity theft; and vulnerability to online exploitation e.g.
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2 Online privacy and security
online payday loans. Data from IC3 shows that growth in violations has increased
rapidly; complaints to the US Internet Complaint Crime Center about online vulner-
abilities, including mass market fraud, online lotteries, charity hoaxes etc. etc., grew
at an annualised rate of 33% per annum between 2000 and 2010 (Source IC3 Internet
Crime Report 2010, p 8).
Whilst there are technical dimensions and solutions to these problems, the most ef-
fective solutions will have to address the realities of real-world human behavior. This
raises some crucial policy questions, made more pressing in the light of recent phone-
hacking scandals in the UK. To what extent do individuals control for themselves the
personal and financial information that they release to the world via email and the
internet? To what extent should governments intervene to prevent abuses? To inform
our understanding specifically about what individuals can do to protect themselves in a
computerised world, this paper outlines and analyses empirically some of the economic
and behavioural constraints which will affect online behaviour.
In addressing these questions, the first section of this paper outlines some of the eco-
nomic factors affecting online vulnerability; the second section extends the analysis by
outlining some of the behavioural constraints on online behaviour. Empirical patterns
are explored in section 3 using data from the British Crime Survey 2009/10 analysed
using least squares and binary dependent variable estimation techniques. Conclusions
and policy implications are outlined in section 4.
2 Online vulnerability in rational choice models
Do people have the inclination and/or ability to protect themselves from fraud and
other security violations? In answering this question, mainstream economics focuses
on models of behaviour which assume that people are selfish, independent maximisers.
Informed by objective factors, they are driven by mathematical judgements about
the relative benefits and costs of their choices and not by more diffuse, subjective
psychological and sociological forces. The policy implication is that individuals should
be left to decide for themselves whether or not they need protection.
Whilst the simplifying assumptions underlying standard economic solutions generate a
clear and simple model of human decision-making, this model often lacks realism and
empirical validity. It assumes markets and behaviour which are perfect, on average
at least, and it is difficult fully to understand within this stark approach the range
of issues relevant to security and human behaviour. Nonetheless a few themes can be
illuminated via modest adaptations to the standard economic model, once sources of
market failure are incorporated into the model, e.g. imperfect competition, network
effects and network externalities, public goods and price discrimination.
2.1 Information security and market failure
In the interactions between computer security and human behavior market failures will
be endemic, exacerbated by the fact that online activity is dominated by networked
goods. Network externalities, high fixed costs, low marginal costs and lock-in all sup-
press competitive pressures and sustain oligopolistic industrial structures. Forces of
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imperfect competition are encouraged further by the complementarities that emerge
because networked products are often consumed in bundles especially if they have little
value in isolation. Consumers of electronic money products for example will be looking
for a system that supports their electronic payments and so compatibility and operating
standards incorporating security are important. Complementarities between different
elements of computerized systems, e.g. between CPUs and OSs, will generate pressures
for producers to merge, increasing oligopolistic tendencies [86]. Other distinctive but
related characteristics of networked goods including externalities and switching costs
will further limit competitive pressures [51], [76], [36]. Network externalities emerge
because the utility derived - for example, from the use of an electronic payment system
- is dependent upon the fact that other consumers are using the same system; but
at the same time, the value of access to additional users of the internet is generally
very small and so the costs involved are not easily justifiable for the individual. In
an online context for example, the additional value to an individual of signing up to
an electronic payment system will be small especially if other consumers are not using
the same payment system [51], [36]. Paralleling microeconomic models of road use,
private incentives generate multiple equilibria including extremes of congestion versus
under-use: a producer may attract all the potential consumers within the network -
or none of them. PayPal is an example of a system which attracts many consumers
just because other consumers are using it; DigiCash was a system which attracted few
consumers and so could not reach the critical mass required for it to survive. Use of the
digital currency Bitcoin is growing but remains constrained by its limited acceptability.
For electronic payment networks to grow and acceptability to widen, in theory at least,
the security and reliability of a system should enhance its acceptability. However,
Bonneau and Preibusch (2009) analyse evidence about social networks which shows
that, whilst the industry is vigorously competitive, privacy is not always a selling point
for the ordinary user even though it may be a concern for hawkish privacy experts
[27]. This generates privacy communication games in which the privacy hawks are
kept happy whilst privacy issues are hidden in order to maximise sign-up, generating
a dysfunctional market for privacy in which privacy is undersold. Further evidence
of dysfunctional privacy markets comes from experimental studies; Beresford et al.
(2010), using experimental data, found that people are just as likely to buy DVDs
from an online store asking for more sensitive data as they were to buy from a store
not asking for this information, even when the prices charged by the two stores were
the same [24]. The negative impacts of individuals’ neglect of their own privacy are
magnified because of commercial incentives to erode privacy: given heterogeneous and
shifting preferences, there are commercial incentives to price discriminate and these will
be enabled by the decreases in online privacy which have accompanied the growth of
online social networks. Decreased privacy has fostered price discrimination by enabling
producers to target individual customers in different ways [10], [11].
Switching costs and lock-in may apply e.g. if exiting a payment system is relatively
more costly than entering it [68]. This is a characteristic that applies to an extent to
PayPal because it is easier to set up an account with PayPal than to close the account
and sign-up for an alternative payments system. Economies of scale will mean that
whilst there are high sunk or fixed costs involved e.g. in developing an electronic pay-
ments infrastructure, the marginal costs of copying and distributing electronic payment
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devices or tokens will be low. This generates a natural monopoly in which the average
cost function declines sharply and limits the operation of competitive forces. These
limits are likely to be more important for electronic systems if the costs of developing
new privacy and security infrastructure have to be borne by private institutions.
Network externalities are also linked to the fact that security is a quasi public good.
From consumers’ points-of-view, if others in the network are adopting security controls
which disable and deter a large volume of fraudulent activity, then there is no incen-
tive for an individual to adopt those security controls themselves. When a network is
already highly secure, then that security provision exhibits many of the key characteris-
tics of a public good viz. non-depletability - the provision of a good or service does not
diminish because of consumption by an additional person; non-rivalry - consumption
by one person does not preclude consumption by others; and non-excludability - no one
can be prevented from consuming the good. This means that, in common with other
public goods, a secure internet is susceptible to the free-rider problems: consumers are
able to free ride on the benefits of others’ cautiousness without incurring any of the
costs, generating a Prisoner’s Dilemma type outcome [10] [11].
2.2 Asymmeric information and principal-agent problems
Standard economic models can be adapted to incorporate the market failures associ-
ated with imperfect/ asymmetric information and misaligned incentives. For example,
as Akerlof’s lemons principle illustrates, markets which are prone to adverse selec-
tion problems are ”thin”; fewer transactions take place because prices reflect average
product quality creating a disincentive to supply good quality products [6]. Unless
signalling or screening mechanisms can be developed effectively to communicate in-
formation about product quality, the bad quality products will drive down prices and
driving out good quality producers. In the context of security and human behaviour
when people select technical products to protect their privacy and security, as the
technical sophistication of products increases the ordinary consumer has far less infor-
mation than the vendors about how effectively these products will work. Fundamental
uncertainty may mean that even the vendor does not know how secure their software
is in practice. Whilst to an extent these problems might be overcome by learning (ex-
plored below), the search costs of investigating privacy products available are likely to
be very high. A standard way to overcome adverse selection problems is to devise a
certification system but if the dubious firms are the ones buying certification and/or
if all firms are buying the easy certification then certification is unlikely to lead to
efficiency gains [11].
Asymmetric information will also generate post-contractual problems of moral hazard
and hidden action. If agents’ incentives are misaligned and the principal cannot effec-
tively monitor the efforts of their agent, the agent has incentives to cheat e.g. a firm
providing security products aims to maximise profits and minimise costs; the consumer
wants the best protection they can afford but most consumers cannot monitor effec-
tively whether or not their ISP or social network is (cost effectively) doing what they
promise to do. Principal-agent problems are also relevant for aspects of online behavior
that involve team efforts, e.g. security protection often depends on the efforts of many
agents and the outcome may depend on either the minimum effort, best effort or ag-
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gregate effort [11] [86] [47]. For teamwork affecting security threats it may be difficult
to identify who is responsible for responsible versus irresponsible online behaviour, e.g.
when opening emails each member of the online community will have an incentive to
free-ride on the responsible behaviour of others, thus generating a Prisoner’s dilemma
game in which collective efforts to promote internet security are constrained. For the
individual, the consequences of minimum effort are not dissimilar from those from
best effort and aggregate effort so, overall, limited efforts will be made, increasing the
vulnerability of online networks to attacks.
3 Behavioural constraints
The security issues discussed above are analysed within a rational choice approach,
allowing market failure but nonetheless retaining a standard economic model which
just allows that behaviour is constrained by imperfect information and market failures.
In reality, limits on rationality are likely to be profound because the world is mutable,
complex, uncertain and so socio-psychological forces will have particular traction in
constraining rational choice.
Herbert Simon softened economists’ conceptions of rationality to allow for uncertainty
by introducing the concept of bounded rationality and distinguishing substantive ratio-
nality from procedural rationality [77] [15]. If people are assumed to be substantively
rational then they are able to form quantifiable expectations of the future and will
maximise utility using constrained optimisation techniques to balance marginal ben-
efits with costs. If different people have access to the same information set, then on
average, they will form identical expectations centred about some objective proba-
bility distribution of outcomes. They will be forward looking incorporating a stable
rate of time preference into their decision-making process. If individuals’ rationality
is bounded in the sense of being constrained by imperfect information, cognitive lim-
itations, and/or time pressures then the sensible application of clear and objective
mathematical rules will be difficult because the existence of immeasurable uncertainty
precludes the quantification of probabilities of future events.
Bounds to rationality will limit opportunities for substantively rationality behavior
in which goals and constraints are quantifiable, enabling the use of mathematical al-
gorithms to guide decision-making. By contrast, procedurally rational behaviour is
more likely given uncertainty because it is based on a broad reasoning process rather
than the achievement of given representative agent’s goals [77]. Procedural rationality
is more likely to be associated with satisficing (ie sticking with the current situation
because it is comfortable even if it is not an optimum) and involves blunter, broader
approaches to information-processing and decision-making. Given the many uncertain-
ties that characterize the ordinary person’s online world, online behaviour is more likely
to be procedurally rational than substantively rational and many of the behavioural
constraints addressed below are consistent with procedurally rational behavior.
6 Online privacy and security
3.1 Risk and uncertainty
In using the internet and in particular when using an online payments system or an
online social network, consumers must form an expectation of the likelihood of the in-
formation that they reveal will be used against them in some way in the future, eg via
online fraud, being fired or ostracised for indulging in indiscrete online gossip, becom-
ing susceptible to identity theft. This raises the problem of capturing how people deal
with risk and uncertainty when making choices that have future consequences. Some
assumption or hypothesis must be made to capture how people form these expecta-
tions about the future. The extent to which it is possible to assign such a number will
be determined by whether the situation is one of Knightian risk or Knightian uncer-
tainty [53]. Events governed by Knightian risk tend to be repeatable and the outcome
of a deterministic and immutable data generating mechanism, such as an unloaded
die or a lottery machine. Under Knightian uncertainty people can say no more than
that an event is probable or improbable; they cannot assign a number or ranking in
their comparison of probabilities of different events. Events characterised by Knightian
uncertainty are more common than those characterised by Knightian risk, at least in
the economic and social sphere. Economic events are often non-repeating, occurring
under conditions that cannot be controlled. Errors in expectations will be non-random
and will not cancel out. Instead they may spread generating systematic trends.
Approaches which assume repeatable events, complete information and/or an under-
standing of the data-generating mechanism will be of little use in understanding online
behavior. First, information is incomplete and the data generating processes dictating
outcomes will often be unknown to the individual. Secondly, online decisions may often
be about nonrepeatable, unprecedented events (e.g. buying from a new eBay trader)
and this means that information about past outcomes will be of little use. Prediction is
particularly complex when it comes to economic processes because the economic world
is mutable: peoples’ beliefs about economic structure have the capacity to change that
economic structure, as emphasised in the mainstream macroeconomic literature on dy-
namic inconsistency [57] and the heterodox literature on non-ergodicity [33]. Reality
changes as expectations change: expectations affect economic events which in turn
determine expectations, e.g. a network will grow because people believe it will grow
because it is growing. Endogeneity will mean that events and beliefs about the system
determine the path of that system [71], [72], [73] e.g. in an eBay auction a price may
go up just because people believe it will go up. Future outcomes will be affected by
current decisions based on expectations of the future formed today: inter-temporal
feedbacks between past, present and future will determine reality. As new informa-
tion accumulates rapidly within large online communities a complex multiplicity of
outcomes is possible and it will be impossible to form a single objective judgement of
possibilities, undermining even more subjectively based Bayesian probability concepts.
Whilst these problems can be addressed to an extent using Bayesian models there are
a number of problems with the Bayesian approach. First, there are practical problems
in its application, e.g. in economics, there is often a paucity of data that can be used
to quantify subjectively formed probability judgements [52]. Also, standard economic
models assume that economic decision-making is highly formalised and, particularly
in an online environment, people do not cope well with formal methods [63]. Human
intuitive cognitive processes do not deal well with more flexible Bayesian thinking
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methods either. For online behavior, an ordinary individual’s knowledge of his/her
online world is likely to be incomplete and so it will be difficult if not impossible to
calculate statistical probabilities based upon past frequencies. Online decision-making
is more likely to be governed by subjective / inductive judgements: a decision to buy an
innovative but relatively expensive virus protection software package is not like dealing
a card from a pack of 52 cards or buying a lottery ticket when you know that one
million tickets are being sold. Other implications for security and human behaviour
relate to legal issues, e.g. in insuring against the consequences of a spam attack for
example, the basic principle would be that risks should be borne by those who control
the risk [10] [11] but for decisions relating to internet use, the risks are interdependent,
uncertain and to an extent unknowable; this profound uncertainty means that it is
difficult to design efficient insurance to protect against online vulnerabilities.
3.2 Learning and social influence
Learning is an essential aspect of rational behavior and given the esoteric and technical
nature of many aspects of online activity, learning processes will be important. For com-
puter privacy and security, learning is crucial because it determines how people adapt
to innovative new technologies which may have many unfamiliar aspects. Learning can
be captured in a limited sense by allowing that people search efficiently for information,
i.e. will search for more information whilst the marginal benefits exceed the marginal
costs of that information. Behavioural economics has enriched economists’ conceptions
of learning by building on insights from behaviourist psychology about conditioning,
as developed in reinforcement learning models. Economists have also developed be-
lief learning models focussed on the processes by which people form beliefs about the
actions of their opponents. Another important form of learning that is receiving in-
creasing attention in behavioural economics is social learning. Without an objective
path to follow, it may be procedurally rational to follow the crowd and/or to learn
from past output signals about what others are doing [83], [1]. Keynes argues that
when your information is sparse you will do what others do because perhaps they have
better information [53], [54] [55] [56]. In Keynes’s analysis, such herding behaviours
can be linked to probabilistic judgements in a Bayesian setting. Differences in posterior
judgements of probable outcomes may not reflect irrationality but instead may emerge
as a result of differences in prior information. Rational economic agents may have
an incentive to follow the crowd and herding will result as a response to individuals’
perceptions of their own ignorance. Herding will be rational if an individual has reason
to believe that other agents’ judgements are based upon better information than their
own: other people’s judgements become a data-set in themselves. In this way, people
will incorporate others’ opinions into their prior information set and herding tenden-
cies reflect posterior judgements of probabilities, see also Sharfstein and Stein (1990),
Banerjee (1992) and Bikhchandani, Hirschleifer and Welch (1992) and Chamley (2003)
amongst others [69] [18] [21][22][30].
Social learning may also reflect broader social influences whether normative (e.g. peer
pressure) or informational (e.g. learning from others’ actions in a non-Bayesian sense).
Shiller (2000, 2003) analyses these ideas in the context of feedback theories of endoge-
nous opinion formation in which beliefs about the system determine the path of that
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system [72] [73] [83] [28] [80]. Similarly, social influence can be described using evo-
lutionary biological analogies, e.g. those based around the concept of memes - the
cultural analogy of genes [34]. Imitation is a distinguishing characteristic of human
behaviour and so a meme can be understood as a unit of imitation [25]. The discovery
of ’mirror neurons’ (neurons in the pre-motor areas of primate brains that are activated
without conscious control and generate imitative behaviour in primates) has lent some
scientific support to biological explanations for imitative behaviour [66]. This biologi-
cal approach is compatible with neural network theories of information processing, i.e.
mathematical approaches that emulate adaptive learning processes observed in human
brains. Successful memes survive if they are remembered and will reproduce when
they are transmitted effectively between people. So memes are more likely to survive
when they map effectively onto human cognitive structures, incorporate a standardised
decision structure and/or have been reinforced by dominant members of the scientific
community [9].
The implications for privacy and security are that individuals’ behavior is likely to be
determined by the actions of others for example people will be more likely to adopt
protections and controls if others in their online and oﬄine networks are doing the
same. The online environment does allow information to accumulate rapidly about the
relative reliability of traders and products, e.g. via online review sites and this is likely
to foster social learning processes. Also, if group leaders can be identified and encour-
aged to adopt appropriate online protections then others will follow their example. If
information about the adoption of safeguards by others is prominent then this social
influence will encourage people to do what others are doing and cooperation between
self-seeking individuals will lead to the evolution of new social norms [13]. The impact
of social norms and social influence has been identified in the context of household en-
ergy choices [74] [82] and similar influences may operate in the online environment too.
Social influences reflecting investments in social capital, cooperation, trust and repu-
tation will also affect online behaviour. For security and human behaviour, decisions
are made in a multidimensional space and reflect contradictory goals and so trust and
control are central; effective security and privacy systems will allow transparent com-
munication between trusted parties but will be closed to the ”bad guys” [31]. Different
social norms about privacy and security will evolve reflecting the speed and anonymity
of online worlds - for example, it is widely believed that the younger generation is more
vulnerable to identity theft because they are far more willing to reveal important per-
sonal information. In terms of policy implications, it is possible that, over time, social
norms about protecting privacy and security can be encouraged to evolve in various
ways including advertising, sanctions and rewards.
3.3 Cognitive bias and heuristics
As noted above, the behaviour of the procedurally rational person does not involve
constrained optimisation. Instead, Simon observes that people may be guided by
”appropriate deliberation” and decision-making processes will depend on the circum-
stances. A procedurally rational person will use common sense rather than complex
mathematical techniques in assessing their current and future choices. In an uncertain
world, actual experience may be surprising by comparison with expectations because
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an imperfect image of the future has been formed in advance (Shackle 1953, Basili
and Zappia 2009) [67], [23]. If people are procedurally rational and the logical link
between objective and subjective probabilities is broken, then a range of choices may
be defensible. In contrast to the substantive approach, different people, even if they
are using the same information, will form different expectations reflecting arbitrarily
assigned margins of error. But if expectations turn out to be wrong, is it because
people are misguided or is it because the economic reality changed unexpectedly? A
large literature has developed analysing the first possibility - that cognitive limits on
human information processing mean that individuals’ subjective probability estimates
are fallible [85] [17]. If the second possibility holds true, will any predictive tool be un-
equivocally superior to all others? If complexity and endogeneity operate within limits,
then the solution may lie with predictive tools that incorporate fuzzy logic methods,
in which the binary concepts of ’true’ and ’false’ are replaced by degrees of truth.
Following from above, research on prospect theory shows that the standard approach
to subjective utility has many limitations [50]. Most ordinary people make common
mistakes in their judgements of probabilities (e.g. Anderson 1998) [17]. This links
into bounded rationality because it reflect limits on the processing ability of the human
mind [48] [84] [9]. Inconsistencies may stem either from individual biases or group
biases. At least two categories of individual bias can be distinguished: motivational bias
and cognitive bias [78]. Motivational biases reflect interests and circumstances and may
link into the principal-agent problems outlined above. They can often be significantly
reduced with clearly defined tasks and incentive structures. Overall, motivational biases
are less of a problem; they can be controlled because they are often under rational
control.
Cognitive biases are more problematic because they emerge from incorrect, often un-
conscious, information processing. Framing effects are a key source of cognitive bias
and capture how people’s responses will be determined by the way / context in which
questions or problems are framed. For example people may exhibit disproportionate
aversion to losses relative to their appreciation of gains and so if warnings about the
consequences of careless internet behaviour are framed in terms of the losses of irrespon-
sible behaviour rather than the gains from being responsible, then they may be more
effective. Also, there will be individual differences in personality traits and other char-
acteristics which may lead some people to be overconfident about their knowledge and
overoptimistic about future events, e.g. victims of online scams may be overconfident
about their ability to distinguish a scam from an genuine opportunity. Overconfidence
is especially problematic for extreme probabilities which people tend to find hard to
assess. This will be relevant for computing decisions: in the absence of meaningful
and available information about security threats, people will be overly sanguine, for
example about their vulnerability to identity theft, and this will be moderated by per-
sonality traits and predispositions which correlate with risk intelligence [41]. A lot of
electronic and/or online activity is done anonymously and so depersonalisation may
also play a role e.g. fraud may be more likely if victims are depersonalized and reduced
by perpetrators to nothing more than a credit card number [8].
Many other cognitive biases have been identified too including familiarity and status
quo biases, attribution error, endowment effects and loss aversion [59]. Some which
may specifically affect online behavior include endowment effects and status quo bias.
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Endowment effects in which people overvalue an object because they own it may af-
fect minimum prices on online sites such as eBay. Acquisti (2004) and Acquisti and
Grossklags (2006) explore a number of other biases specifically affecting online be-
haviour including people’s tendency to prefer the current situation generating status
quo bias, a phenomenon also explored by Thaler and Sunstein in a range of contexts
[2] [3] [82]. Some of these biases can be manipulated to encourage people to engage
in more efficient behaviour - for example status quo bias, which is about the fact that
people tend to favour the existing situation and will tend to avoid the effort involved
in changing their choices. Setting online default options cleverly can exploit this bias
e.g. if the default option is the maximum privacy protection then a large number
of consumers may procrastinate in changing these options thus giving them default
protection from security violations.
Cognitive biases also emerge from the use of heuristics, i.e. common-sense devices
or rules of thumb derived from experience. In general terms, it may be procedurally
rational to use simple heuristics because they allow people to make relatively quick
decisions in uncertain situations. They are used because a full assessment of available
information is difficult and/or time consuming or when information is sparse. For
example, when thinking about buying new software, an ordinary person may have
little real knowledge about what is going to happen in the future; given this limited
information, they may rely on heuristics to decide. Following the crowd, as discussed
above, can be seen as a learning heuristic which sometimes will lead individuals to the
wrong decision generating herding externalities. There are a number of other types
of commonly employed heuristics that produce cognitive bias including availability,
anchoring and adjustment, representativeness, and control [49] [84]. Availability is a
recency effect; it is the heuristic of judging an event to be more likely if occurrences
of the event can be recalled with relative ease. This may enable quick decision-making
but is biased by the prominence of certain events rather than the actual frequency
with which these events occur, especially if the event has had a lot of attention in
the news. For example, headline news of airplane crashes will be brought to mind
more readily than bike crashes, even though the latter are far more frequent. This
suggests that economic decisions are affected by memory. Learning and forgetting have
particular implications for online security because the modern online world requires
memory, most significantly the memory challenge of remembering a large number of
passwords. Privacy and security are affected by memory lapses especially because
online vulnerability increases each time someone has to change their password because
they have forgotten it. This generates a trade-off because password entropy, i.e. the
best passwords are unpredictable, is negatively related to memorability: unpredictable
passwords are harder to remember [32]. Behavioural economics potentially offers some
lessons because forms of forgetting are captured within economic models of learning
including belief learning models of weighted fictitious play in which recent experiences
are given greater weight than more distant experiences and also in Erev and Roth’s
reinforcement learning model which incorporates forgetting as an adjustment parameter
on past events [40].
For security and human behaviour, the availability heuristic combined with an overop-
timism bias may lead people to decide that security is not a problem because they
haven’t had a problem with it in the recent past, but if recent news stories have fo-
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cussed on security risks then people may be disproportionately focussed on protecting
their security, e.g. recent stories about firesheep, cloud computing and unsecured infor-
mation sharing might encourage more people to be careful about how they use privacy
settings on facebook and twitter.
Anchoring and adjustment is a single heuristic that involves making an initial estimate
of a probability, and then revising or adjusting it up or down in the light of new infor-
mation [84]. This typically results in assessments that are biased towards the anchor
value. Anchoring effects may operate in a social dimension if one individual’s judge-
ments is ’anchored’ to others’ opinions [84] [37]. If someone’s friends and colleagues
are all talking about the benefits of some new software, then a person’s judgement of
that software may be anchored around these opinions.
Lynch (1996, 2003) connects bias with social influence and the evolutionary replication
of ideas arguing that ’thought contagion’ affects a wide range of human behaviours
and beliefs [60], [61]. Social learning, as discussed above, may interact with individual
biases when group interactions generate more complex forms of bias because people are
interacting and copy each other thus spreading misjudgements quickly through groups
of people. Cognitive biases may lead people to over-estimate each probability in a
set of exhaustive and mutually exclusive scenarios and they do not correct probability
estimates when the set of exhaustive but mutually exclusive outcomes is augmented,
leading to an estimate of total probability in excess of one. Judith Anderson argues
that these types of probabilistic mistakes reflect the nature of memes [9]. The problem
originates in the input format of data, and in algorithms used; but if prompted by
clear signals, the human brain is able to deal with probabilities more effectively. For
example, if students are asked to judge the probability of two coincident events within
the context of a statistics class, then they will know what to do. However, if outside
their classes they are confronted with a problem requiring probability judgements for
a situation in which it is not obvious that this is what is required, then they may
make an instinctive, intuitive judgement generating statistical mistakes [58]. Anderson
suggests that Bayesian approaches could be refined by blending frequentist methods
with mental, visual imagery and graphic display - an insight that could have many
applications for online environments which enable the use of complex imagery - at the
extreme in virtual reality environments. Using these innovations may enable people
to avoid online vulnerabilities by enabling human cognition to process probabilistic
information more effectively.
The impacts of cognitive bias will be conditioned on broader psychological factors
and psychological factors will have an independent impact too. Aside from cognitive
bias, analyses of real-world behaviour often reveal that people’s decisions are driven by
non-rational, unsystematic forces such as gut feel [46], [45]. Gigerezner and Goldstein
argue that gut feel and other heuristics are fast and frugal decision-making tools [45],
[46]. Biases and heuristics may just be procedurally rational but blunt decision-making
tools i.e. a way to use information roughly to cut costs and save time. This does not
necessarily imply that behaviour is stupid or misguided, e.g. gut feel and animal spir-
its may drive positive entrepreneurship when Keynes’s animal spirits - spontaneous
urges to action overwhelm objective pessimism [55] [14], see also Akerlof and Shiller’s
broader analysis of animal spirits [7]. Many of these non-rational forces are caught up
with socio-psychological motivations and whilst these are woolly concepts and there-
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fore difficult to analyse, there is increasing evidence that they are relevant (e.g. see
Loewenstein’s analysis of animal spirits). Akerlof and Shiller also focus on the impact
of corruption which often grows during boom phases but builds fragility into a system
making it vulnerable to instability; this may have online parallels because with the
growth of the internet and mobile networks have grown, the motives and opportuni-
ties for online crime have grown concomitantly whilst at the same time increasing the
fragility of the system.
3.4 The role of emotions
The impact of behavioural constraints on online behaviour will be affected by emotional
states. There is a growing literature exploring the role of emotions in economic decision-
making [38],[39],[16]. The impact of emotions on human decision-making can be used to
pull together the wide ranges of concepts and ideas explored in behavioural economics,
economic psychology and neuroeconomics. Neuroeconomics also has a lot to offer
in increasing our understanding of the neurological foundations of reward processing
and risk [70]. It also escapes specious distinctions between rational, irrational and
non-rational behaviour and enhances our understanding of evolutionary processes /
proximate mechanisms, e.g. those that generate temptation and procrastination, as
discussed above. Emotions can be addressed in different ways and the emotional factors
most likely to be relevant to online behavior are the occurrent emotions, i.e. emotions
that are generated jointly caused by dispositions and events and so are generated in
a particular context [39]. Emotional states more broadly will affect decision-making
processes, i.e. when people are in a hot emotional state, then they are more likely to
act impulsively [20]. In the online world generally, actions can be implemented at
very rapid speeds which means that fast moving, quick decision-making based on the
overriding of reason by emotion may lead to a range of self-defeating behaviours. A
disposition towards implusivity is triggered in online environments because decisions
can be implemented so quickly, e.g. when participating in online gambling and online
trading.
Emotions will have an impact on information acquisition, learning in response to new
information and the choices which emerge from learned responses and these paths from
information through learning to action and the constraints upon them are captured in
in Figure 1.
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In acquiring information, emotions will affect subjective perceptions of information
e.g. perceptions of risk will be affected by emotional states. Slovic et al (2004) argue
that risk itself is a feeling when it is a intuitive, instinctive response to immediate
danger [79]. Minsky (1997) analyses emotional constraints arguing that the ’nega-
tive knowledge’ associated with some emotional states may inhibit whole strategies
of thought [62]. When processing of information learning processes are affected by
cognitive limitations. Susceptibility to cognitive bias may be affected by emotional
responses: people in a happy mood are more likely to use heuristics associated with
top-down processing, i.e. relying on pre-existing knowledge with little attention to
precise details. By contrast, people in a sad mood are more likely to use bottom-up
processing heuristics, paying more attention to precise details than existing knowl-
edge [75]. Emotions have also been shown to affect learning processes in computer
based learning environments [4] [5]. As learning is translated into action, emotions
and visceral factors will again have an impact because observed behaviour will be the
outcome of an interaction between reason and cognition versus emotion and affect.
Personality will play a role because personality may generate predispositions to par-
ticular emotional states and effective privacy and so security systems could be tailored
to suit different personality types [11].
3.5 Time inconsistency, temptation and procrastination
A specific type of decision-making bias with particular relevance for online behavior
is present bias emerging from time inconsistency. People’s behavior may be inconsis-
tent over time when plans to do something constructive in the future (e.g. backing-up
files) change as the future becomes the present because people procrastinate and they
lack self control [64] [65] [35]. This can be captured theoretically by a small tweek to
the standard economic assumptions about exponential discounting; by introducing a
present bias parameter into standard discount functions, preference reversals and time
inconsistency can be captured analytically. There is a wide literature demonstrating
the relevance of present bias to a wide range of microeconomic and macroeconomic
behaviours [44] [12] [42] [82]. Present bias may not be irrational and may reflect a
procedurally rational approach, for example if people are treating different financial
decisions in different ways by allocating them to different ’mental accounts’. Exper-
imental evidence shows that people, experiencing a windfall gain of $2,400, will save
different proportions depending on the circumstance of the windfall and the context
in which the windfall is received: they spend $1,200 if the windfall is spread over a
series of monthly payments, $785 if they receive a single lump sum and nothing if is an
inheritance. Thaler argues that this is because rather than treating economic decisions
together as a single gigantic maximization problem people assign different events to
separate mental accounts [81].
Acquisti and Grossklags have analysed the implications of present bias for people’s
choices about privacy and security building on the behavioural economics literature on
procrastination and self control [2] [3]. When using the internet people will procrasti-
nate about setting up effective security systems in much the same way as many people
procrastinate about backing-up files. Procrastination is potentially a key policy issue
particularly if the most effective privacy and security solutions are to be driven by indi-
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vidual choices. Models of temptation are also explored in behavioural economics [43]
and the temptation and procrastination models can be spliced to reflect the fact that
procrastination and temptation are opposites. Actual behavior may also be driven by
individual differences because those with self-insight will be aware that they are prone
present bias but will be sophisticated enough to realise that this might generate in-
consistent behavior [64]. They will rationally decide to set up precommitment devices
to moderate the impact of future temptations. In the context of security and privacy
problems, they can be encouraged to setup precommitment devices such as identity
verification systems or setting computer default options which exploit the status quo
bias so that they are effectively making less effort to protect themselves from security
violations in the future.
Habits will also play a role and models of habit formation can be developed from insights
about adjacent complementarity [19]: utility in the past and present is complementary
to utility in the present and future which means that habits will persist over time; so if
sensible habits to protect privacy and security can be inculcated then over time these
habits will become more and more ingrained. If people can be encouraged to repeat
good habits (e.g. backing-up files, doing regular virus checks) often enough then the
habits will stick and people will do more to protect their online privacy and security
4 Empirical Analysis
In the preceding section, some of the behavioural constraints on the management of
online privacy and security were outlined and in this section, survey data from the
2009/10 British Crime Survey is used to analyse some real-world behavioural patterns.
4.1 Empirical hypotheses
The following empirical hypotheses will be explored:
Hypothesis 1 Individual differences, e.g. differences in age, gender and socioe-
conomic background, will explain an individual’s susceptibility to
fraud.
Hypothesis 2 Susceptibility to fraud will also be affected by behavioural dif-
ferences and victims are more likely to be regular users of the
internet and specifically of online banking and shopping.
Hypothesis 3 Precautionary behavior (e.g. shredding documents, changing
PINs, taking out anti-fraud insurance) will vary across individu-
als and will be affected by demographic differences in age, gender
and socioeconomic background.
Hypothesis 4 Precautionary behavior will also be affected by behavioural differ-
ences with regular internet users being more experienced and bet-
ter informed and therefore more likely to take precautions against
fraud, particularly ”virtual” precautions, e.g. using computer se-
curity.
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Hypothesis 5 Fraud victims are less likely to have taken precautions before
fraud took place, i.e. were more vulnerable to fraud before it
happened.
Hypothesis 6 Behavioural constraints will affect precautionary behavior and
behavioural change amongst fraud victims after they were vic-
tims will be limited - reflecting procrastination, habit persistence
and/or slow learning.
Hypothesis 7 These behavioural constraints will be balanced by the magnitude
of financial losses and those who suffered large financial losses
as a result of fraud are less likely to procrastinate and will be
more likely to take precautions after fraud takes place.
Hypothesis 8 Psychological factors will play a role and people with strong emo-
tional reactions to the threat of fraud will be less likely to behave
in a substantively rational way and therefore will be no more
likely to take precautions than those who don’t have a strong
emotional response to the threat of fraud.
4.2 Data sources
These empirical hypotheses will be explored using STATA to analyse data from the
2009/10 British Crime Survey (BCS). BCS participants are asked a wide range of ques-
tions about their experience of and attitudes towards crime. Recent versions of the
survey have included questions about fraud /identity theft, level and type of internet
use, nature of anti-fraud precautions employed as well as a collection of demographic
questions. The specific details and definitions of the variables used in the empirical
analysis are summarized in Appendix 1. Most of the variables are self-explanatory
with the exception of the sets of BCS questions about precautions taken against fraud.
To enable parsimonious estimation, these questions have been amalgamated into broad
measures as follows: whether or not physical precautions, e.g. shredding documents,
checking cash-points etc, have been used; whether or not virtual precautions, including
regularly changing PINs, using only secure websites and using security software, have
been used; and whether or not insurance was taken out. Respondents were asked to
indicate whether or not they are taking these precautions now and, where applica-
ble, whether they took them before they were defrauded. This enables an analysis of
behavioural change, as explored below.
4.3 Likelihood of fraud
The probability that a respondent had suffered bank fraud via use of their personal
details without permission was estimated using a probit link function to capture the
impact of internet use, demographic characteristics and precautionary behaviour on
the probability of fraud. The results from the estimation are outlined in Table 1
and show that people who use online banking are more vulnerable to fraud, people in
higher socio-economic groups are more vulnerable to fraud and people who take physical
precautions are less vulnerable to fraud. Virtual precautions have no significant impact
on the probability that a person has experienced fraud.
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Table 1: Risk of fraud
Probit estimation with robust standard errors n=14,260
Regressor Parameter estimate t ratio p value
Internet use -0.016 -0.600 0.549
Online banking 0.183 3.580*** 0.000
Online shopping 0.066 1.190 0.234
Online social networking 0.022 0.460 0.649
Gender 0.037 0.850 0.393
Age 0.000 -0.900 0.368
Socioeconomic group -0.037 -3.450*** 0.001
Virtual precautions 0.018 0.550 0.586
Physical precautions -0.049 -3.750*** 0.000
Insurance 0.030 0.610 0.541
Constant -1.745 -14.640 0.000***
n=14,260
Likelihood ratio test:
χ2(10) = 62.65 [p = 0.000]
4.4 Precautionary habits
To establish what factors are associated with precautionary behaviour, three mod-
els were estimated using either Tobit for censored regressions (for the estimations of
number of virtual versus physical precautions taken) and probit for the binary depen-
dent variable capturing whether or not people took out insurance against fraud. As
explained above, the BCS provides data on precautions taken before fraud and after
fraud so these models incorporate the before fraud behaviour as an explanatory vari-
able and the parameter estimate on this variable will show the persistence of habits
and/or the degree of learning. Other regressors included in the precautionary measures
estimations include whether or not someone has been a victim of fraud, their emotional
responses / extent of worry about card fraud, levels of internet use including online
banking, online shopping and online social networking and demographic variables, The
results are outlined in Tables 2 to 4.
The results from the estimation of virtual precautions (see Table 2) indicate that fraud
victims are less likely to take virtual precautions against fraud suggesting that they
are not learning from their exposure to fraud and are not changing the precautions
they take in response to their experiences. Further estimations of changes in virtual
precautions (not reported here) showed that there is no significant relationship between
increasing virtual protections and the magnitude of reported losses from fraud. In
addition there is a strong degree of persistence with an almost one-to-one relationship
between precautions taken before and after fraud. This again suggests that any learning
about the value of taking precautions is limited and/or habits are sticky / persistent and
so if someone is not in the habit, e.g. of changing their PINs, then their precautionary
behaviour is unlikely to change even if they are a victim of fraud. The results from the
estimation of physical precautions (see Table 3) confirm the stickiness and persistence
of habits and again the parameter estimate on precautionary behaviour before fraud
18 Online privacy and security
Table 2: Virtual precautions against fraud
Tobit estimation
Regressor Parameter estimate t ratio p value
Virtual precautions before 1.056 59.020*** 0.000
Fraud victim -0.072 -2.560** 0.011
Emotional response (1=high) -0.007 -0.330 0.738
Card worries (1=high) 0.024 1.380 0.169
Internet use -0.013 -0.650 0.513
Online banking 0.080 2.510** 0.012
Online shopping 0.002 0.040 0.967
Online social networking 0.020 0.710 0.477
Gender 0.029 1.090 0.278
Age 0.000 -0.640 0.525
Socioeconomic group -0.004 -0.670 0.506
Constant -0.267 -2.920*** 0.004
n=1275
Likelihood ratio test:
χ2(11) = 2066.84 [p = 0.000]
Table 3: Physical precautions against fraud
Tobit estimation
Regressor Parameter estimate t ratio p value
Physical precautions before 0.944 72.730*** 0.000
Fraud victim dummy 0.034 0.600 0.546
Emotional response (1=high) -0.106 -2.700*** 0.007
Card worries (1=high) 0.011 0.320 0.750
Internet use 0.067 1.850* 0.065
Online banking 0.031 0.510 0.610
Online shopping -0.002 -0.030 0.977
Online social networking 0.075 1.350 0.178
Gender 0.020 0.380 0.705
Age 0.000 -0.100 0.917
Socioeconomic group -0.012 -0.900 0.370
Constant 0.380 2.100** 0.036
n=1275
Likelihood ratio test:
χ2(11) = 2149.21 [p = 0.000]
is approximately equal to one. In addition, a heightened emotional response (in the
BCS high emotions are given a low numerical value) are associated with more physical
precautions which may be explained by the fact that heightened emotion is propelling
precautionary beahviour. More regular internet use is associated with more physical
precautions, perhaps because regular internet users are more aware of the dangers
to which they re explosed. Fraud victims are not significantly more or less likely to
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protect themselves after fraud. In addition there is a strong degree of persistence with
an almost one-to-one relationship between precautions taken before and after fraud
and, as for virtual precautions, this suggests that any learning about the value of
taking precautions is limited and/or habits are sticky / persistent.
Table 4: Insurance against fraud
Probit estimation
Regressor Parameter estimate t ratio p value
Insurance before 3.893 23.290*** 0.000
Fraud victim dummy -0.150 -0.930 0.351
Emotional response (1=high) -0.201 -1.720* 0.085
Card worries (1=high) -0.016 -0.160 0.875
Internet use -0.140 -1.410 0.160
Online banking 0.096 0.500 0.618
Online shopping -0.224 -1.020 0.307
Online social networking 0.067 0.370 0.709
Gender -0.179 -1.110 0.265
Age -0.001 -0.250 0.800
Socioeconomic group 0.000 0.000 0.996
Constant -1.024 -1.790* 0.074
n=1275
Likelihood ratio test:
χ211) = 1228.32 [p = 0.000]
The results from the probit estimations of decisions to insure (see Table 4) show
again that precautionary measures are persistent suggesting slow learning and/or sticky
habits. Apart from that, the only significant parameter is that on emotional response
and this is similar to the response for physical precautions: less emotion (higher scores
on the emotional response variable) is associated with a lower probability of insurance
and, as for physical precautions, fear of fraud may propelling the decision to insure.
4.5 Discussion of results
The results above suggest that certain features are associated with different aspects
of fraud risk and precautionary behavior. People who use online banking are more
susceptible to fraud which is unsurprising as they probably are more exposed to attack.
Those in higher socioeconomic groups are more vulnerable to fraud, perhaps because
they have greater access to financial services and/or have sufficient income and wealth
to attract frausters. The factors associated with precautionary behavior vary between
those who use more virtual precautions (e.g. identifying safe websites from padlock
symbol, regularly changing PINs and using computer security measures) versus those
who use more physical precautions; but in both categories, the significance of the lagged
precautions variables for all empirical models of precautionary behaviour suggest that
there is strong persistence in behavior suggesting that procrastination, slow learning
and/or sticky habits affect behaviour. For virtual precuations, the other significant
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factors are that more worry is associated with fewer precautions (though the direction
of causality is unclear) and those use online banking are more likely to use virtual
precautions. People who have previously been fraud victims are less likely to use
virtual precautions suggesting that learning is slow, that fraud victims are more likely
to procrastinate about setting up protections and/or that habits dominate and are
unlikely to change.
5 Conclusions and Policy Implications
In designing effective policies to ensure privacy and enhance security a key policy de-
bate focuses on the relative roles to be played by government regulation versus private
initiative. In designing mechanisms to ensure that people adopt a more responsible ap-
proach to protecting themselves online, policies will need to take account of the realities
of human behaviour by keeping the alternative options simple and cheap. Also, given
rapid technical change e.g. in the growth of cloud computing and mobile technologies,
policy solutions must also be flexible and adaptable to changes in people’s computing
habits. Since 911, geopolitical factors have necessitated a cautious approach to the
development of systems especially those which enable the cheap and anonymous elec-
tronic movement of money. For phishing attacks, the marginal costs are very low for
the perpetrators and the chances of being caught are slim so a significant problem will
be formulating strategy proof designs given the very small costs faced by perpetrators.
Is it ever going to be possible to manipulate their incentives to prevent privacy and
security violations? Fines and penalties might be more effective but, for both phishing
and online fraud, the capacity for governments effectively to police these violations is
limited. So effective solutions will necessarily have to concentrate on encouraging peo-
ple to take a longer term view when protecting their privacy and security. Sophisticates
who are well-informed about the dangers of identity theft etc. may use pre-commitment
devices without much prompting but for people who have limited knowledge or experi-
ence, psychological and emotional factors will exert significant impacts and so policies
should be designed to take account of these subjective factors as well as objective ones.
6 Data Appendix
Data codes and definitions are outlined in Table 5. Data are from the 2009/10 British
Crime Survey, accessed via the UK Data Archive. Material from Crown copyright
records made available through the Home Office and the UK Data Archive has been
used by permission of the Controller of Her Majesty’s Stationery Office and the Queen’s
Printer for Scotland (Usage No 5571). Those who carried out the original analysis and
collection of the data bear no responsibility for the further analysis and interpretation
of these data in this paper. In submission to the Home Office for comment before
distribution.
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Table 5: British Crime Survey (BCS) Data Codes, Questions and Definitions
Variable Code Definition
Fraud victim qbnkuse Have personal details been used fraudulently?
Loss qloss2 Range of monetary loss?From 0 to ¿1000
Emotional response qfremot How emotionally affected? 1=Very,3=Little
Card worries qcardw How worried are you about card fraud?
Precautions before qpreca-s Was precaution taken before fraud?
Precautions now qprec2a-s Is precaution taken nowadays?
Internet use intern2 Internet use 1=used daily 7=used every 3 months or less
Online banking intern3a Do you use the internet for online banking?
Online shopping intern3a Do you use the internet for online shopping?
Online social networking intern3i Do you use the internet for social networking?
Gender sex 1=Male, 2=Female
Age age Numeric value
Socioeconomic group respsec2 Socioeconomic Classification,1=professional,8=never worked
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